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NOTES
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS-OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASES.
There is little judicial dissent from the general rule that
occupational diseases are not compensable under Workmen's
Compensation Acts. Such diseases are the gradual result of con-
tinuing to perform the particular kind of work, so that it would
be impossible to refer the happening of the injury to any par-
ticular time, and the disease is what might naturally be ex-
pected, if work of that character is pursued.
For convenience the cases on the subject may be divided
into four groups. Each of the forty-two compensation states
will fall into one of these.
(a) Massachusetts grants compensation for any incapacity
resulting from occupational disease. Although the usual Work-
men's Compensation Act provides that the injury must be "by
accident" or "accidental," the Massachusetts statute does not
make use of the word "accident" in any form but provides for
compensation for "personal injury." This same phrase "per-
sonal injuries" without reference to their accidental character
is found in other states but they have not given it the same
liberal construction as has the Massachusetts court.1
The broad meaning given to the term "personal injury" by
the Massachusetts court is illustrated in Hurle's case.2  "The
difference," the court said "between the English and Massa-
chusetts acts in the omission of the words 'by accident' from
our act, which occur in the English act as characterizing personal
injuries, is significant that the element of accident was not in-
tended to be imported into our act. The noxious vapors which
caused the bodily harm in this case were the direct production
of the employer. The nature of the workman's labor was such
that they were bound to be thrust in his face. The resulting in-
jury is direct. If the gas had exploded within the furnace and
thrown pieces of 'cherry' hot coal through the holes into the
workman's eyes, -without question he would- have been entitled
"Mifler v. American BteeZ & Wire Co. (1916), 90 Conn. 349, L. R. A.
1916E, 510, 97 At. 345, 14 N. C. C. A. 842; Industrial Gortmiis son v.
Brown (1915), 92 Ohio St. 309, L. it. A. 1916B.1277, 110 N. E. 1. 744.
2Hurle's Case (1914), 217 Mass. 223, L. R. A. 1916A, 279, 104 N.
E. 336, 4 N. C. C. A. 527.
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to compensation. Indeed there probably would have been com-
mon law'liability in such case. . . . There appears to be no
sound distinction in principle between such case and gas escap-
ing thro nh the holes and striking him in the face whereby
through inhation the vision is destroyed."
(b) The statutory definition of a compensable injury
under the Maryland Act is not that it is an "accident" or that
it is an injury "by accident" but that it must be "accidental
injury." A distinction between the adjective "accidental" in
this statute and the u~ual noun "accident" found in most acts
permits the granting of compensation for occupational diseases
in Maryland.
In a recent Maryland case 3 the appellee contracted phos-
phorous poisoning while employed by the appellant in the mak-
ing of fireworks. She worked in the "spit devil department"
where, some time during the years 1921, 1922, 1923, or parts
thereof, she gradually contracted the disease through the in-
halation of noxious fumes and gases collected in the place where
she worked. The court in calling attention to the fact that the
Maryland act provides compensation for "accidental injuries"
as distinguished from injuries "by accident" said, "the differ-
ence is important as it marks the divergence between the thing
or the event (i. e., accident) and a quality or a condition (i. e.,
accidental) of that thing or event. As the substantive carries
the idea of something happening unexpectedly at a time and
.place the temnaccident' or 'injury by accident' has been con-
sistently construed-by the courts to embrace two different no-
tions; the first is that of unexpectedness, and the second, that
of an injury sustained on some definite occasion, whose date can
be fixed with reasonable certainty. The adjective 'accidental'
is not a technical term but a common one whose popular usage
would not necessarily mean that the words 'accidental injuries'
indicated the existence of an accident, but rather the idea that
the injury was either unintended or unexpected. See 25
Harvard Law Review, pp. 338, 342. In the term 'accidental in-
juries,' the substantive 'injuries' expresses the notion of the
thing or event, i. e., the wrong or damage done to the person;
while 'accidental' qualifies and describes the noun by ascribing
3 The Victory Sparkler & Speciaty Co. v. Catherine R..Franoks, de-
cided February 12, 1925.
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to 'injuries' a quality or condition of happening or coming by
chance or without design, taking place unexpectedly or uninten-
tionally."
The court held that, although the disease was the gradual
result of the employment, the fact that the appellee continued
at her place of labor, in the doing of her common and regular
task, made it clear that the phosphorous poisoning happened
without her design or expectation, and so her injury was acci-
dental within the meaning of the act.
(c) The majority of compensation statutes contain the
provision that compensation shall be payable for injuries by
"accident." Practically all of the cases passing upon the ques-
tion have decided that occupational diseases contracted by the
inhaling of poisonous fumes or gases or being exposed to in-
dustrial conditions productive of disease are not by "accident"
within the meaning of the statutes. Generally the courts adopt
the rule that the word "accident" denotes an event "which oc-
curs upon the instant, rather than something which continues,
progresses, or develops. 4 Others express it by saying that the
expression "accident" is "used in the public and ordinary
sense of the word, as denoting an unlooked for event which is
not expected or designed.'' 5 The elements of suddenness and
unexpectedness are the essential ones.
(d) The Kentucky Compensation Act provides that per-
sonal injury by accident shall not include diseases "except where
the disease is the natural and direct result of a traumatic injury
by accident." The inclusion of the word "traumatic" in the
Kentucky act not only excludes occupational diseases but makes
it essential that a physical force be directed against the body.
The statute was construed in Jellico Coal Company v. Adkins,6
where the court, said, "It will be observed that all of these
definitions of 'trauma' and 'traumatic' imply the presence of
physical force, and this is the generally accepted meaning of the
word. Evidently the act implies that some external physical
force actually directed against the body must occur in order to
constitute traumatic injury by accident." In that case the ap-
4 Tjeffreys v. Charles H. Sager Co. (1921), 198 App. Div. 446, 191 N.
Y. Supp. 354.
5Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of Cal.,
171 Pac. 429.
e 197 Ky. 684, 247 ,S. W. 972.

